This paper is offered as my contribution to the debate as to the nature of soldiering and warfighting in the year 2025. It has not been written to address the force structure in which the Soldier of the 21^st Century serves. Just as none of us could have predicted, in 1975, the force requirements of 2001, none of us is blessed with the foresight to predict what this will be in 2025. This paper instead paints an imaginary picture of the soldier in 2025 and the environment in which he/she serves.

The environment described in this picture is created by a recognition that the need of the Army is for soldiers – full or part-time – who can competently perform their function in the conduct of warfighting in a complex environment, whatever and wherever that may be. It suggests that with radical and far-sighted changes that totally reshape the way the Army is managed and led, the physical and organisational structure at that time will emerge naturally in response to real and potential threats to this nation, and such emergence will be initiated as often from the lower ranks as it will from the higher formations.

INTRODUCTION

The year is 2025. A meeting of senior officers and civilian advisers is taking place in a remote conference centre. The meeting is being led by an army officer, a professional facilitator from the AITC (Australian Instructional and Training Corps) whose brief is to draw from the group their input to three questions: What have we done well over the past year, what have we not done so well, and what can we do better next year?

The answers to these questions won’t emerge solely from the experience of the participants. Like all soldiers before them their experiences are limited by what they personally have seen and done. The responses they give to the facilitator’s directions will be the sum total of input gathered from similar meetings held by regional and regimental commanders in the weeks prior to this.

These meetings are conducted annually with discussions centring on the outcomes of similar focus group meetings held by their respective senior NCOs and junior commanders, whose deliberations will have included the output from similar meetings attended by junior NCOs and other ranks. The questions will therefore not be answered solely from the participant’s area of expertise and level of authority but will include thoughts and lesson learned emerging from all levels within each person’s scope of responsibility.

These group meetings have, by 2025, become standard operating procedure for all levels of the defence forces. In the first decade of the 21^st century they were introduced in the wake of the recognition that the army was a mixture of integrated and self-organising systems that impact on each other in unpredictable and innovative ways. Such systems were acknowledged as not just the linear mechanical or bureaucratic decision making systems that traditionally guided the way in which the army had conducted its business but also the processes employed and outcomes achieved by individual soldiers of all ranks as they went about performing their duties. Doing something as a result of gathering information, for example, and thinking about what needed to be done was recognised as a system in its own right – and one that could be employed at all levels, by both individuals and small team or at higher headquarters and the ADF as a whole. Other systems included the way soldiers of all ranks interacted with each other and with their environment (natural, geopolitical and materiel), decision making and problem solving in symmetric and asymmetric environments, and the emergent and self-managed processes through which the army as a whole and each individual member perceived and acted out their role in society.

It was late in the first decade of the 21^st century that the benefits of tapping into this form of system thinking became evident, particularly as the army began to introduce modern knowledge based management and leadership processes into what had become a very staid and antiquated system that had changed little since the dawn of the 20^th century. The result of the introduction of such thinking was that over the next decade and a half the army totally transformed itself into a fully integrated system within which many sub-systems acted – sometimes independently and sometimes in an orchestrated way – to create outcomes that had never before been thought of as possible.

In doing this, what emerged was an army that was, by 2025, not only a major actor in the nation’s defence, it was also an industry in its own right. Within this industry services are provided and outcomes achieved that were never traditionally – and officially – thought of as critical to the way in which army went about its business. The purpose of the army was by 2025 no longer to simply undertake those tasks that are, as Von Clausewitz contended, an extension of a nation’s politics, but to also create a national and global environment where war has become the least favoured option of nations. In doing so the Australian Army came to be recognised for its proactive contribution to international peace as well as its historical and well deserved reputation as a war fighter.

AIM

The concept behind this paper arose from discussions that the author has held with men and women of all ranks of the regular and reserve army over the past 25 years, a period in which he has taken a deep interest in what it means to be a soldier and why men and women enlist into and then make a career out of service in the ADF.

This paper also arose out of the author’s studies into the complexity sciences and chaos theories, theories that are more and more being recognised as fundamental to the effective and efficient performance of any organisation, be it military, for profit or run by volunteers.

By searching the past for trends and patterns in the way in which individuals have created environments whereby they could maximize their contribution to the achievement of strategic and operational objectives important to them and their activities at the time, and drawing from these the lessons behind successful outcomes studied and reported by the complexity theorists, it was a simple matter to form a picture of a future landscape in which the army achieves the mission set for it by the government of the day. This paper describes such a landscape and offers, for discussion, several concepts which if adopted can potentially both integrate to create the complex environment in which the army of the 21^st may well be found, and at the same time make sense of the reasons behind the directions that the army must take if it is to achieve the tasks and roles set out for it.

THE ARMY OF 2025

The spark that lit the fuse of modernisation at all levels of the Australian Army was the realisation that despite its busy-ness, no-one was really sure what the role of the army was, either regular or reserve, or its function in the complex global and national environment in which terrorism was the primary weapon of a nation’s enemies.

Despite applying all of the combined knowledge gathered from over a century of achievements in supporting allied and coalition war objectives, Australia like other western nations had no answer to the War on Terrorism. Enemies of the west were no longer other nations but other philosophies, and not necessarily philosophies shared by all within certain communities. It was a form of terrorism born out of guerilla warfare conducted as far back as the 1950s and 60s by small groups who knew that their strength lay not in defeating their opponents in the field, for their resource base was far too small for this, but in defeating the will of the people to support any response – either military or civil – that opposed the achievement of their objectives.

The relatively simplistic argument, for example, that it was racist to identify the nationality of a terrorist gained such favour in western countries so intent on maintaining a reputation for their egalitarian and inclusive community spirit that no propaganda campaign was capable of garnering total popular support for military actions. This meant that while the Australian population in the early 2000s didn’t wholly come out against the actions of the ADF during the War on Terrorism, it never really supported it either at home or abroad.

As a result the ADF, and because of its land-based capability the army in particular, found that the battles they fought were only supported while they were not losing. Winning the war was not an option if it meant casualties. This was the position of their political masters and was therefore a position that the military planners had also to take. It also meant that the traditional methods for fighting were no longer sustainable and a new approach had to be found.

While other armies had learned that combating such an enemy meant adopting the means for gathering intelligence and managing knowledge throughout all levels while at the same time supporting a traditional combat capability, the Australian Army found it necessary, because of its limited size and resources, to take a more radical approach. A concept known as the Hardened and Networked Army was adopted but this was taken by many as a sign that more computers and radios were to be issued to soldiers at all levels. While this sped up communications it also introduced the potential for the wrong communications to be passed resulting in essential messages being lost in the swamp of unessential messages.

While many civilian agencies had found that they could overcome this problem by cutting back on what was being communicated throughout their establishments, and in some cases even switching internal email facilities off, the army found that the communications systems that they had established had gone too far to allow for any back peddling. So rather than continue to waste money and effort purchasing more computers and communications equipment in the hope of creating and expanding linear and data-centric networks, the army turned to its people and the quality, not the volume, of intelligence and knowledge they were capable of creating. Realising that in many cases the troops at the front line, and throughout the army’s logistic and support chains, were in many ways more capable than their commanders of gathering and using knowledge as intelligence, and had better means and greater incentive to do so, the army set about returning to the basics and simply talking to people, something that ever since the Australian Army’s inception in 1901, and the advent of the Hardened and Networked Army in 2005, had not featured highly on its list of priorities.

The drive for a new army to meet the challenges of the 21^st century came from within the army itself. The focus groups (now commonly called Skunk Groups) that each year conduct a critical evaluation of where the army has come from and where it is going to began in 2006 when a small group of officers and NCOs met to discuss the long term viability of the army to achieve the purposes for which it was employed. While their findings and recommendations initially created a great deal of chaos across all levels of the army, such chaos was welcomed. In fact the sparks of such chaos were deliberately fanned by this group and their ‘champions’ to create the mindsets and incentives needed to address new situations and possibilities. Introducing complexity into the lexicon of military thinking was one example of where such chaos was initiated by this group.

The complex warfighting environment

Over the years since complexity became both a concept and an ideal the army ceased to be a monolithic establishment based around centuries old paradigms and instead became recognised as a series of systems that individuals could create and disassemble as needed. While some translated the term complexity to mean urban environments or close country, the original focus group disagreed, adopting instead the definitions provided by complexity theorists and scientists whose contentions it was that complexity and chaos were merely descriptors of the environment in which any undertaking was being performed. A room empty but for people with dissenting views could be defined as a complex or, depending on the degree of dissention, chaotic environment. Whether it be stable, complex or chaotic patterns within such environments could easily be discerned and addressed in a systematic and logical way. Thus the pressure was taken off commanders and decision makers who felt that problems could only be overcome with logic and reasoned argument, and asymmetric environments dealt with using predetermined and planned processes. It also took away the element of luck that leaders have so often relied on in order to successfully achieve their objectives.

As a result of adopting such definitions organisations and units were able to better manage their way through situations and environment that were characterised as either stable or chaotic, or anything in between and depending on the situation at the time – situations and environments that were sometimes consciously created and sometimes not. The culture that emerged throughout the army enabled such flexibility and with this flexibility came creative thought and innovative approaches to the ways in which issues and situations found in complex and asymmetric environments were overcome.

A driver behind the need for change was a recognition that the issues and challenges that the army would face as it entered the 21^st century were far more complex than anything it had confronted in the past. These issues and challenges were not just those associated with the War on Terrorism but also those associated with the role that the army was to play within its own society and those who would be employed (recruited) to do so. To address these challenges a new way of thinking had to be adopted, and for some this meant accepting that the old order and widely accepted definitions were no longer appropriate.

But this meant change, and change of a considerable magnitude. In creating change more emphasis had to be placed on micro level interactions that occur naturally throughout the army because by adopting the new definitions it was far more easily recognised and acknowledged that this is a primary conduit for creativity and innovative solutions to complex problems. Emergent behaviour in any society is certain, but the outcome of this behaviour is not, and in its attempts to shape such outcomes the army had inadvertently stifled all creativity and inherent capability at addressing complex problems. As soon as army, at all levels, recognised that emergence and uncertainty were critical to achieving outcomes regardless of the complexity or otherwise of the environment, the achievements it made far outstripped the pain and anguish it took to get there.

One significant change was the acceptance that the greater the divergence of agents in any system, the richer the patterns and outcomes, creativity, productivity and culture that will emerge. In army the agents were its people, and by promoting and encouraging the use of alternative and instinctive pathways of interactions a culture was created that was no longer closed to outsiders (including outsiders who were not of the appropriate qualification or background) but was open, flexible and reactive to change. It enabled a tapping into intelligence sources that were available right throughout the army – not just laterally but also vertically. It encouraged a higher degree of human style interactions across all levels that were previously not possible within the hierarchical command and control models of the past. It also enabled a more integrated and coordinated view to be taken of the many systems that have always been found within and throughout the army and the emergent and self-organising manner in which they would constantly form and reform to address issues that are of importance to them. 

Such systems have always been evident throughout the army but never before had they been accepted as a critical means by which the environment experienced both operationally and non-operationally had been traversed.

Upon investigating the phenomenon a little more closely what the army found was that the notion of environment is both perception and reality. As well as the physical environment in which it finds itself, time and space are critical elements of the environment in which the army goes about its business. This environment during operations is known as the battlespace landscape, and it is not just terrain but also time and space and the agents that interact therein. This battlespace is made up of peaks and troughs that must be traversed with an equal degree of vigour and resolve – the lessons of Vietnam and Iraq taught us that physically securing the high ground is never enough – and only those who are fittest to traverse it will survive.

Outside of operations the army also found that interconnectedness of the networks that exist throughout its ranks creates a way of ‘web’ thinking, communications that are transitional from cooperation to co-evolution as groups adapt in concert with each other. This becomes the communications space across which thoughts and reflections are directed, and from and to those with the required level of capability to employ them. These communications spaces weave through and over the battlespace and in times of both peace and war create web strategies from which self-organising teams emerge that are based on whichever webs/ecosystems are best suited to their task and the roles they will play.

The veracity of this was easily accepted when it was realised that it is only in periods and environments of total control and stability that the traditional hierarchical model worked. In the past, whenever pressure was put on the ‘system’ and the environment transitioned towards complexity or chaos, informal and long-standing communications systems would be brought into play. These informal systems bypassed the accepted hierarchy but, in doing so, achieved more robust outcomes that could be latter ratified using the traditional models. As a result, through the work of the early focus groups the concept of battlespace and communications space was accepted and acknowledged as the basis upon which a new army had to be born. From this emerged the means to modernise the army in both its structure and the way in which this structure is populated and maintained. These were set around a number of objectives which, while not being an end-state in themselves were the means by which the desired end-state was achieved. The first objective was a modernization of the army.

Modernisation of the army

Objective: The responsiveness of the army to current and future threats is enhanced through a process of self-organisation and continuous development.

The year 2025 was the objective set for modernisation of the army. The term modernisation had been used a number of times over the century and a quarter that the Australian Army had been in existence but in each case had been used in reference to a modernisation that was measured against its own benchmarks, not those employed by the function for which it had been created.

Since the mid-1800s the army had been largely based on the British model but by 2008 the idea to benchmark its structure and operational capability against other organisations, more notably private and public sector organisations, took hold. Adopted in particular was the need to use criteria and standards that many well functioning and effective organisations right around the world that had been using to measure their own progress and achievements.

The catalyst for modernisation was that the army was no longer male dominated and best driven by a mechanistic command and control model so favoured since before Cromwell’s reforms in the 1600s. Because of the nature of society and the capability of those who were enlisted from it, the army was more and more becoming a series of individuals and groups who, as integrated systems, were capable of adapting and evolving in response to both external stimuli and the interactions/feedback within the systems themselves. Such a complex, yet adaptive, system had underpinned the operations and maintenance of special forces since the 1950s and with the need to create a modern army capable of shaping and successfully conducting warfighting operations in similar complex environments, it was adopted by the army as a whole

In doing so, however, it was realised that in planning for this modernisation concentration had to be on the needs of the primary client group. Like any organisation the army has clients who pay it for services that it provides. But such services have traditionally only been provided in a proactive rather than a reactive way and were centred on a ‘make and sell’ type service provision. In other words, the army was only ever employed after international events had reached a level where their use was inevitable, and if their current level of expertise was not at that required to undertake such employment an unnecessarily lead time was required. This meant that until such time as the nature of their employment and use was determined, members of the army were expected to maintain a high level of expertise and fitness for a purpose which was never fully defined or understood until such time as it became reality. Then it would ‘make’ its product (i.e., personnel and equipment at a level capable of achieving the desired operational objectives) and ‘sell’ it to its client. Up until this point many skills were gained and technology introduced whose purpose and functionality were either based on past scenarios or, insofar as future needs were concerned, could only be guessed at. It also saw the client paying many times over for a capability that it was unsure it would ever need or, it it did need this capability, was unsure what it would need it for. This created a Just-In-Case resource which, the planners for the army’s modernisation found, could be replaced with a much less expensive but more highly effective Just-In-Time capability.

In developing a plan for the modernisation of the army a project team was formed which employed consultants whose expertise was not in the defence arena or even in the area of protective or emergency services. They employed organisational experts, people who ignored the fact that the army had a role that involved far greater risk than any other, and instead concentrated on firstly defining its function or purpose and then the structure and resources that would be required to fulfill it. The result was that, for the first time, the purpose of the army was defined and, through this, the purpose or function of its sub-elements were similarly defined and their objectives more clearly laid out.

Of importance were the structure of the army and the human and physical resources required to create and maintain it.

The structure of the army of the 21^st century

Objective: The structure of the army at any given time is that which best brings together all of the resources required to meet immediate operational and future strategic threats.

Identified during the 2025 working groups one of the most important was the restructuring of the army to reflect the realities of modern society. Part of this reality was the way in which society has changed, as has the role that army had come to play over the previous 50 or so years.

Like any organisation the function or purpose of the army has been both the cause and the outcome of its every action. It had been this way since Federation, but since World War Two this purpose had seen the number of soldiers prepared for and used in actual combat lessen to the extent that such missions were being undertaken by less than a battalion grouping at any one time. This was not because the role or function of the army had changed, but because the costs of doing so had gone beyond what a government and its people were prepared to pay. As a result contracting saw the civilianisation of many roles previously held by uniformed troops and wherever possible off the shelf products and services replaced those traditionally performed by soldiers. Integrating civilian with military transport and communications systems gave greater flexibility to supply chains which meant that they, in turn, could be extended and as a result the number of troops required to conduct operations was also reduced. The remainder of the army by 2010 was being used more and more as either a heavily armed police force in support of regional governments or as inexpensive labour in times of natural disasters.

But this was the reality of the times and its realisation meant that the role of the defence force shifted from reactive national defence, for such a concept, it was painfully obvious, was outside of the ADF’s capability, to that of a nation builder reaching out to promote and create regional stability in whatever form this may take. This change in strategic direction was a task that had taken nearly two decades to fully realise and implement and was not achieved without much pain and effort.

Such a restructure was not only necessary to meet the challenges of non-conventional warfare, a phenomenon understood but never really applied since the last conventional battles were fought during the Korean War, but to also exploit the strengths that the young men and women borne out of a 21^st century society were bringing to the service.

For the first 17-20 years of their lives these young soldiers had been taught the importance of the individual and his/her place in society. They had been encouraged to be more environmentally conscious and humanitarian, but at the same time to question the status quo and look for better and faster ways of achieving outcomes that are important to them and their environment. They grew up in a geographically unstable region where the pain of their neighbours was a pain they shared, where to help others in distress small groups would quickly come together without leaders, resources or official sanction. The soldiers of the 2020s were not just used to gathering themselves together for a worthwhile cause, they sought explanations of such causes behind everything that they did, and being part of the military did not dampen such a need.

They also came to expect that gratification was something that could be achieved instantaneously, and in doing so became mistrustful of organised systems that concentrated on long-term achievements. What life had taught them by the time they joined the army was that they could shape and pattern their own future based on the here and now, and they were highly skilled in using – or creating – the technology to do so.

The men and women of the 21^st century army were unlike any that had served their country before them, and the ADF knew that to retain them and exploit their strengths the army, and not they, would have to change.

With the changing nature of society family units and communities had by this time become a thing of the past. For the new wave of soldiers the army by 2025 is their family and it is here they experience, for some for the first time, a powerful feeling of belonging and trust. But this trust has been created not by them being forced to conform to a society that is not only alien to them and has been created and upheld by the very system in which they had little faith, but to a society that had been shaped and molded by themselves. It was these young minds that were able to identify the gaps and deficiencies in the way in which the army was run and were able to point out and create the solutions. Fortunately, for the ADF, the officers and NCOs who commanded them were also a product of the early 21^st century society and their flexibility and initiative allowed for such changes to be seamlessly and painlessly made

The simple need to attract and retain new ideas and youthful exuberance to the army was just one motivation for change, another was the realisation that the system itself was slowly grinding to a halt. Aside from the fact that the basic structure of the army had changed little in the first one hundred years of its existence, it became very clear as the new millennium dawned that the army could not continue to exist and meet the needs of the coming decades based on models that were in many ways inappropriate even for the immediate past.

The notion that the ADF, with so few numbers and resources, could hope to defend this country with significant external assistance, or would even be asked to do so, was questioned in the light of the real tasks that it was called on to perform. That the army – or in fact the whole ADF – could protect this country against a force capable of invading it was farcical at best, dangerously suicidal at worst. That an army smaller than that which surrendered to the Japanese at Singapore during World War Two, even with every man and woman armed and able to conduct defensive operations, could be anything more than a nuisance to an invader was recognised and finally acknowledged by both politicians and the public alike.

Fortunately national defence was a task that the army was never called upon to carry out, so in a time when humanitarian missions were more important than military operations to regional stability and close cooperation, the ADF had become highly regarded as a leader in this field.

The catalyst for change was further stirred when it became clear that, with the paradox of training and resourcing constantly aimed at conventional warfare but framed within a world engulfed in non-conventional battles and global terrorism, and in constantly training for war but employed in peaceful humanitarian missions, many members were confused about their purpose in life. This was not only evident in the regular forces but was much more pronounced within the reserves. Moreover, those with real tasks to carry out (i.e., real insofar as the ADF’s traditional roles were concerned) and objectives to achieve were being hamstrung by the ever more intrusive directions on how to do this passed on by planners and decision makers reflecting an ever increasing risk averse government.

In this regard the introduction of mass and instantaneous communications systems as part of the Hardened and Networked Army, while enhancing the speed at which information could be passed, did not alleviate the burden of command and decision making: It instead exacerbated the interference at all levels of the army by those whose career tenures were threatened by actions that were many levels removed from their positions. The lessons of Vietnam had been well and truly forgotten here with the result that troops at the frontline had, within a short time after the introduction of the new communications capabilities, ceased making decisions altogether and simply did and went as they were told.

This created a groundswell of disaffection that saw many units, particularly those in the General Reserve, all but disbanded for lack of numbers and resources. Clearly something needed to be done. The solution came in the decision to conduct a major research study that sought answers to the question of the purpose of the ADF and whether or not, under the existing structure, there was sufficient resources and support – in all quarters – to achieve it. The outcome for army revealed wide gaps between what was realised was its real purpose and the way in which it had been structured and supported – and through this its capability to achieve either – for many decades,

For many years the only power within army was that which was bestowed upon it by the government of the day. Senior officers were promoted, demoted or moved sideways depending on the whim of parliament and this had a real debilitating effect right down to the lowest reaches. While geo-politically this may have been a logical way of maintaining control over what the army did, and where, it also had the opposite effect in that such control only ever achieved one outcome – an outcome that pleased the political masters. Any other outcome was avoided or swept under the carpet thereby lessening, in reality, the control that the politicians had over the army.

Traditionally such political power was based on a fear, rooted in the French Revolution of the 18^th century but building paranoia across all governments since, that an army of the people would – or even could – turn on its political masters if the will of the people demanded it. In Australian society this, it was realised, was found to be totally without substance and the politicians came to understand that by loosening control over the current structure and functioning of ADF they could, in fact, gain far greater control over its direction and future achievements. For the first time in its one hundred year’s history the purpose of the defence force became at one with the aspirations and beliefs of the people it defended and protected. The first and most important outcome of the functional analyses carried out across the army in 2007 revealed a far greater purpose than simply defending Australia and ‘its national interests’. It revealed a societal responsibility that was based on an army that was of and with the people. This meant that egalitarianism, for example, was much more than a buzz-word applicable to the environmental and community conscious civilian population. It became a simple and most effective means of drawing on the strengths of not only those serving in the ADF but also those who supported it.

To achieve this, the hierarchical structure adopted from and maintained in line with the British Army in the 18^th century by the fledgling colonial defence forces was dismantled and the functions essential to each level redrawn. Rather than being a hierarchy of ranks, the functions within the army became based on the tasks that each was to perform, not the rank of the position holder. In place of the single career stream two functional streams appeared – a combat stream in which those whose function it was to undertake combat and combat associated tasks, and an administrative stream – those whose day-to-day tasks centred on the administration and logistics systems that supported the combat stream. This also enabled some corps to be amalgamated and certain ranks to be abolished.

By 2015 a more streamlined and capable army emerged that was structured in a way that achieved the purpose of its function – and the purpose of every function within it. Individuals were trained for their role or function and not for their rank, and the savings that emerged out of ridding itself of unwanted training activities were reinvested into research aimed at introducing strategies to enhance knowledge and skills across all levels.

This enabled an army to be built not on the traditional rank structure but on people – regular, reserves, full-time, part-time, volunteers, civilians (embedded civilians and OGA/D), suppliers, contractors and the citizens it serves. For the first time it was recognised that people fight wars and the generals and politicians, like the equipment they use, are only a resource. By 2025 rank and position were no longer a status symbol or a recognition of power but an indication of competence, and competence not just at leading others but also managing the affairs that support them.

The irony is that none of these initiatives changed what already existed throughout the army, and had done so for many decades. What it did do was formalize what had been unofficially carried out in the past and in doing so recognised and acknowledged the reality of operating in a complex environment. As the bureaucratic and hierarchical systems of linear communications and decision making was more and more bypassed in operational tempo of the early 21^st century there was a higher degree of interaction at the lower levels than ever before. The internet and mobile phones that all soldiers of every rank had access to, even during operations, meant that the traditional chain of command could be bypassed when to follow it meant that the advantages of fluid thinking and quick actions may be compromised.

Strict hierarchies and systems were officially done away with, and because operations were more and more being conducted in complex and chaotic environments the need to manage the communications chain shifted to become a need to manage the people who made up this chain. It is not that the traditional approach was wrong, simply that it was not enough to cope with intense, high velocity change needed to maintain the initiative in a complex battlescape. The new structure didn’t replace the old: It simply adopted a new range of traditional management practices to complement those that already existed. Those processes and systems that were no longer relevant were removed and control of procedures and policies was replaced with even more important practices, such as those associated with the way in which the army’s most precious resource – its people – is managed.

Human resource management

The Army of 2025 is recognised as more flexible, inclusive, humanitarian, and providing of a higher degree of personal fulfillment than ever before. It is now more successful than it ever has been because the management of tasks and leadership of teams is the responsibility of soldiers at all levels not just those with certain worn rank. Whereas it was once the role of these people to direct and control the actions of those below them, responsibility for controlling and directing the actions of themselves and those around them is now held by all ranks. This allows for a higher and more efficient degree of self-organisation in order to meet current and emerging threats – not only military threats but also those related to unit structure and capability, for example in the gathering and use of resources.

Not only are units given the means to directly acquire the equipment and resources they required, so too are they able to recruit the men and women needed to employ them. Promotions across and transfers between units and corps are also commonplace in 2025. As the concept of widespread networking through the army became more widely accepted in response to the War on Terrorism, Infantry officers in particular became welcomed within other corps. Their experience and expertise in defensive and offensive systems planning ensures that infantry support is no longer extensively required by non-combat arms troops who are now capable of carrying on with their primary task while at the same time taking full responsibility for their own defensive and offensive operations. Similarly, specialist officers and NCOs are being ‘poached’ by infantry and other combat arms because of their networks and specialist management skills

This is not the only reason why transfers and promotions between corps have become more attractive. The reality of society is that, by the middle of the first decade of the 21^st century, loyalty to one organisation or career is no longer a priority – on the part of both employees and employers. The industrial relations agendae introduced at the end of the 20^th century widened the gap between employer and employee with the result that by the early 21^st century almost all employees are on limited term contracts (albeit with options to extend) that could be cancelled at any time by either party. Because of the uncertainty that this causes, long term loyalty ceases to be a priority when short term survival is paramount in the minds of employees. By 2010 such uncertainty was also widespread throughout the army.

This is not just the case with lower level staff either. Senior management are also under similar arrangements, even in the ADF, and when it comes to protecting the higher wages and better conditions concentration on one’s own survival will naturally always take centre stage. This is a phenomenon experienced right across society and has become so commonplace that organisations providing such security are very much in the minority.

On the other hand, security of tenure is also sometimes seen as a negative aspect of employment within certain organisations. Employment for more than 4-5 years with one organisation or in one profession is an indicator of a lack of initiative and drive. It certainly indicates a lack the experience needed to underpin competent performance across a range of functions and tasks therefore one’s employability is quite often questioned when such limited experience exists.

But such experience is not only seen as that which is gained hierarchically – it is more cherished when it includes experience gained at the same level but across different environments, contexts and situations. A high degree of competence at one skill, or in one field, is far less attractive than good competence at many. This means that in order to qualify for promotion an officer or NCO is expected to have a widespread range of experiences, not just training and qualifications. In some instances the experience is given greater weighting than any qualifications and by 2025 it is not uncommon to find officers and NCOs with fewer qualifications than those they lead and manage but with greater experience.

As commonplace as it is, insecurity by 2025 had become the catalyst behind offering soldiers and officers opportunities to enhance their military career and gain greater experience through the adoption of a more flexible career path. It was realised in 2010 that the ADF was the only organisation not to provide such opportunities so a human resources group was set up within army for the purpose of career management. Where responsibility for this had traditionally been held by individual corps and, within each corps, cells looking to the needs of regular and reserve soldiers, a single function was created. This saw the drawing together of responsibility for all army career management, both regular and reserve, under the one umbrella, against the needs of the ADF as a whole and managed at one point.

Career management, however, is not restricted to command level but is also practiced at unit and sub-unit levels. Here commanders are taught and encouraged to embrace the concept of personnel management and as a result individuals are able to discuss, with their immediate commanders, their plans for their career and the opportunities that may be open to them. Commanders, taking a leaf out of private industry, understand the only real alternative to such a flexible attitude to the needs of those for whom they hold responsibility is to see them apply for a posting at best, or elect discharge or resignation at worst, which would not only lessen their effectiveness it would also be to the detriment to the ADF as a whole. The result is not only a far greater understanding by commanders of the goals and aspirations of those for whom they held responsibility, but also greater motivation on the part of their subordinates to seek opportunities within the army – and the ADF – rather than leave to search for them elsewhere.

Where this approach is seen as most effective is in its ability to offer and promote a more inclusive environment in which all personnel worked. Decentralization of units away from the communities that they are charged with protecting, and the creation of facilities and living/working arrangements that encourage individuality and interests outside of the military workspace, had by 2010 all but totally disrupted the unity and sense of purpose that many soldiers felt. The traditions and history of the army, those fought for and won by their parents and grandparents, underpinned the reason that many of them joined the army – that and the high level of camaraderie and team spirit offered in the recruitment advertisements. But on joining it was clear that these were neither evident in the training that they received nor was it encouraged in the environment in which they lived and worked. As a result many failed to see a reason for giving their loyalty to one unit or even the army as an employer.

This alienisation was exacerbated by the accommodation in which soldiers lived. By the end of the 20^th century barracks, those that were actually built within military establishments, resembled apartments blocks in which havens were created where soldiers could close their doors and never have to interact with others until work commenced the following day. Camps had gone from being fully self-contained villages where all of the entertainment a soldier desired could be found, to a group of work buildings around which was found the sleeping and eating quarters of those employed there. Living off-camp therefore became not only desirable but mandatory if one was to retain one’s sanity – that and the fact that it was actually more economically beneficial to the individual to live in town than it was to live in the barracks.

By attempting to create living and working conditions that more closely resembled those experienced by non-service personnel the army had inadvertently forced soldiers to remove themselves from the very thing that they had enlisted to experience. Soldiers joined the army to enjoy the life of a soldier, not a civilian whose job entails wearing a uniform. Army decision-makers had overlooked the fact that one of the strengths of an army is the bond forged between its members. Throughout history soldiers have rarely fought for a cause more aggressively than they have fought for each other, and by encouraging off-barracks or (when living in-barracks) independent and insular living arrangements the army had unintentionally broken these bonds.

Even where such facilities existed the design of their accommodation meant that those soldiers who were not encouraged to live outside of their barracks only met each other out of hours when they ate in the mess – and only on those occasions when they couldn’t avoid it. Many messes (particularly officers and senior NCOs) allowed member to eat outside or in their rooms which meant that they only met each other during normal civilian business hours. With this, and the greater reliance on computers as their primary means for communicating, soldiers began to find that not only did they have little in common with each other they were actually incapable of creating any form of interpersonal communications in the first place. Where these facilities did not exist soldiers also only met during normal civilian business hours, and their dependents hardly ever. This lack of community within the army had been of serious concern for many years and was often quoted as the single most critical reason why regulars and reservists elect discharge but until the working groups were formed in 2007 little or nothing had been done to address it.

For married members and those in permanent relationships the situation was even worse. To be living alone, even when accompanied by a partner and family, thousands of miles away from family and friends, created a strong sense of isolation that few were prepared to tolerate beyond the minimum enlistment period. As a result of single soldiers being separated from their mates and married or accompanied soldiers from their social and support network, external interests and personal stability began to be of greater attraction and as a result elective discharge was by 2005 at an all-time high. And countless parliamentary debates or inquiries failed to isolate the real reasons why.

The need to join social groups was a trait that was felt less and less across society since the end of the 20^th century and as a result the decentralization of units and their facilities made it more difficult to build a sense of belonging and camaraderie within many units. The decision to move units away from their civilian environment and their established social infrastructure also saw individual soldiers of all ranks, and their families, becoming even more isolated. This was particularly true of those units who were not combat-focussed and therefore never provided the opportunities for members to experience the bonding that arises out of collective hardships and motivated unity of purpose.

Even in groups with the strongest bonds and highest esprit de corps there were still individuals who would create their reality based on their most dominant needs at the time. This created small centres of thinking and activity which, when overlapping or integrating with the thinking and activity of others, saw outcomes that had ramifications that were both unpredictable and unrepeatable. The increased use of drugs and other anti-social behaviour in some units was an example of this.

At times individual capability, at both ‘fitting in’ and doing one’s job, resulted in outcomes that were more than the sum total of each individual’s contribution. Both the action of individuals and the way in which army responded to it created a snowball effect that resulted in barriers being erected to the achievement of any kind of outcome short of total chaos. A highly effective unit or sub-unit would stumble when confronted with issues that were outside of its current capabilities such as occurred when conventionally trained soldiers were tasked with undertaking unconventional operations during the Second Iraq War, or when commanders were confronted with soldiers charged with mutilating and torturing animals. While each individual analysed the unforeseen issues that they had been confronted with and sought answers as to how to address and overcome them, overall effectiveness in such situations was lessened to the point where unit capability suffered. This is not to say that their capability at conventional operations were in any way lessened – they were not. In fact many of the lessons that were being learned while trying to address the issues surrounding non-conventional operations actually enhanced their operational and tactical capability. It is just that when it came to unconventional operations, or any other issue or situation that was outside of their current frame of understanding, their experience and knowledge was not yet at a level where individually and collectively they could operate with total effectiveness.

Such a phenomenon was recognised – and accepted – not as a weakness on the part of the soldiers concerned but as a natural progression, an adaptation between knowledge and skills that were possessed and applied in situations and environments that were relatively stable and controlled, and those that were required in environments that were complex, asymmetric, and chaotic. Isolating individuals, groups, or whole units was fortunately recognised as a significant contributor to this.

Recognised also was the paradox that even thinking about such issues needed to adapt from conventional to unconventional. Wherever possible the responsibilities of units and corps that had traditionally concentrated largely on administrative and logistic tasks were handed over to civilian agencies and their remaining members integrated into the combat and supporting corps that remained

Recruitment and training

By 2025 recruitment is not based on the ability to pass certain barrier tests but on each individual’s capability insofar as future needs of the army is concerned. All uniformed members of the army are recruited together as a cohort and initial recruit training is carried out in each state. There is no separation of recruits and officer cadets because capability for either stream, and for technical training within each stream, is tested during combined recruit and IET training conducted initially at state level and later centrally.

Civilians employed to support the army (clerks, drivers, suppliers etc.) are also required to undertake induction training that includes basic military skills appropriate to their role or function. The lessons learned during the Bosnian conflict and the First and Second Iraqi War showed that there was a need for civilians to understand and react appropriately to environments that are unlike anything for which their civilian experience would have prepared them. If their wish is to be employed by the commonwealth in support of the ADF then they must meet the same conditions of service as those within the ADF itself.

Insofar as the General Reserves is concerned, as early as 2010 they were once more recruited directly by units under whose sponsorship they received recruit training at regional centres. And like their regular counterparts they were also recruited as cohorts with no separation between OR and officer basic training.

By 2025 all training for Army (and indeed the ADO) was centred within ADFA. The purpose in doing this was to address both training and education needs, technical/vocational needs and ongoing academic needs of all soldiers – regardless of their rank – in an holist manner. Given that many technical/vocational positions require academic studies to a greater or lesser degree (just as many academic studies require technical/vocational), centring all training in ADFA allowed for seamless and lifelong learning processes to be created for and adopted by all members. It also allowed for an instructional corps (the AITC) to be established and populated by professional trainers and educators, not part-timers drawn from other military streams and brought together under the umbrella of individual commands. Because these authorities and commands in the main were recognised as being staffed by amateurs without skills or competence in the management of training and education they were phased out of the Army altogether and their functions handed over to ADFA. Such centralization also allowed Army to be ‘self-accrediting’ thereby making incalculable savings in efficiency, effectiveness and costs.

Centralising all training within ADFA also allowed for all corps training to be designed, implemented and evaluated from one central location. Because of this, changes required to any part or form of training throughout its lifecycle were more quickly introduced without recourse to other authorities who may or may not understand the ‘full picture’. Human capability needs analyses and evaluations were also programmed in to the lifecycle of every training and education program and this ensured a continuous benchmarking of quality was constantly carried out against both the current and future needs of the army as a whole.

By creating this system it was possible, during recruit/IET training, to earmark those with natural/inherent mechanical or technical skills for advanced training in such professional vocations as electrical, medical, mechanical or construction fields (for which those with existing skills/qualifications are granted RPL and advanced standing). At the same time those with leadership capability were identified and earmarked for future officer and NCO training. Both IET and leadership training were viewed as a continuum of training and education that begins at recruitment and only ceases upon discharge. Initial training in either stream commences with significant emphasis on the behaviourist skills which eventually leads to the cognitive (i.e., learning the basic skills, applying the basic skills, teaching others the basic skills).

Conclusion

Underlying the new army of 2025 was the real need to enhance the networking and communication processes needed of a relatively small but agile armed force. The concept of asking people for their opinion, for example, saw the need to break down the barriers between ranks and undo the artificial divide that had grown out of the separation of officer and other rank training, accommodation and employment. All men and women, those destined for officer rank and those whose ambitions were not as high, those seeking administrative or technical positions and those looking for a combat role, all attend the same training for the first twelve months of their career and live together in purpose built accommodation. This not only took away the inadvertent British style class structure that existed between those fortunate enough to attend university training at ADFA and those not so fortunate (a class structure that the British themselves had been deconstructing for over 100 years), it also created the peer networks that would last with members throughout their entire careers. Now all members attend firstly recruit and IET training and then a program of continuous professional development, run by the AITC under the auspices of ADFA and aimed at building and furthering their chosen career.

Combining the training with continued professional development also enabled much broader networks and communications webs to be built between not only serving members of the army but also with those who had for whatever reason left to take up a career in private industry and government. Such networks were found to be of incredible importance when it came to such things as interoperability between the armed forces and industry or government agencies. It also allowed for members of certain government agencies, and private defence industry suppliers, to accompany the army on operations without fear that any inexperience might see them cause harm to themselves or to others. Since, by 2025, all three forces (army, navy and RAAF) had for some time been attending the same combat and weapons training alongside, where appropriate, state and federal police and emergency service officers, interoperability of equipment, tactics and logistics was all but guaranteed. Moreover, a greater understanding of the capabilities of individuals and teams seconded from other government agencies for embedding within combat units was assured as was their strengths and weaknesses insofar as their ability to fully participate in local and overseas operations. This was backed up by ongoing annual conferences and seminars aimed at building and enhancing such ties. Again this was run under the auspices of the ADFA.

Why such a concept worked is because of the recognition that the generations of soldiers born after the 20^th century were unlike any that had gone before them. With the almost overwhelming preponderance of electronic gadgetry and individual communications systems available to children of all ages, society by the second decade of the 21^st century was largely individualistic and disconnected. Personal computing and SMS messaging all but replaced human interactions, and 24 hour accessibility of this technology meant that people no longer had to physically meet with their neighbours or even their family to hold a conversation with them. It was far easier for people to gather support to provide assistance to others living outside of this country’s borders than it was to get up enough energy to visit the people who lived next door. By combining all training and personal development from the outset a sense of community was created which, based on the rigours shared by all attending that training, stayed with them throughout their careers and beyond.

The outcome of this was, by 2025, an army in which soldiers are as competent, as qualified and as intelligent as the officers that command them – sometimes more so. In addition, officers are as technically competent as those they command in the basic functions of their trade – again, sometimes more so. Both join the army together and are trained for their jobs, not their rank, and as all training is competency-based they achieve a level of capability beyond simply being trained and qualified. They achieve a level whereby they ‘own’ the profession or task for which they are trained and thereby have a stake in its maintenance and the creation of new and more cost-effective ways of doing things. Indeed, a central element of their competence is the ability to do this – something assessed and noted in their annual appraisal.

In 2025 even officer training which culminates in a degree after six years is competency-based and includes less technical competence but greater skills and knowledge in management and leadership. Within ADFA schools that support and maintain specialist functions (e.g., training, human resources, research and development, administration) are created and maintained and attendance at these is open to soldiers of all ranks. In doing this army becomes less reliant on civilian agencies and more capable of flexible and self-organised change – change that emerges naturally from within itself and as a means of addressing complex issues arising out of existing by necessity in asymmetric environments.

 This, then, is the Army of 2025. Will these ideas become a reality? Only the future knows, but shaping the future must start now. The soldier of the year 2025 is not yet born. What future will we bequeath to him? What future do we want to bequeath to him? That is our only decision.